Systematic Scaremongering or Real Integration: Ukrainian Refugees in the Netherlands as a Source of Strength, Not a Burden

Author: Denys Keshkentiy. 5 December 2025.

In recent years, Dutch society has witnessed intense debates about migration, especially since the arrival of more than 135,000 Ukrainian refugees from 2022 onward. Some politicians, particularly from right-wing parties such as Geert Wilders’ PVV, have systematically promoted narratives about the “excessive burden” that these newcomers allegedly place on the economy and society. Wilders, for example, has claimed: “Ukrainians are coming to the Netherlands en masse not because of the war, but for free housing, care and our jobs,” calling our country “the fool of Europe.” Such statements, often fuelled by media campaigns, create an atmosphere of fear and distrust. But are these fears justified? As someone who observes these processes from the inside, I decided to examine the facts, drawing on official data, surveys and statements from key figures. The results are clear: Ukrainian refugees are not destroying the Dutch system; on the contrary, they are making a significant contribution and making the Netherlands stronger. This is a story of solidarity, integration and potential that we risk losing because of prejudice. Data from authoritative sources such as the Clingendael Institute and the European Commission confirm: the economic return from Ukrainians exceeds the costs, and their integration is exemplary.

To understand whether Ukrainian refugees represent a cost “anomaly,” it is useful to compare them with previous migration waves, particularly the Syrian and Palestinian refugees who arrived in the Netherlands between 2015 and 2021. According to official figures from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country spent approximately €3 billion between 2015 and 2021 on humanitarian aid in the Syria region, including refugee reception. In 2015 alone, €260 million was allocated for regional refugee support, while total reception costs in 2021 amounted to €726 million. Research by IZA shows that the long-term fiscal impact of immigrants (including Syrians) is often negative in the initial phase, with a net burden of around €400,000 per person due to high integration costs.

By contrast, expenditure on Ukrainian refugees from March 2022 to February 2025 is estimated at a total of €3.26 billion (Statista). For 2024, projected costs were €3.4 billion, including €3 billion for accommodation, €97 million for education, €220 million for healthcare and €23 million for municipal expenses (based on 111,500 people). Unlike Syrian refugees, however, Ukrainians show much faster integration: research by the European Foundation notes that Ukrainian refugees have higher employment rates (up to 50 % across the EU), which reduces long-term costs. Comparative analysis shows that the costs are similar in scale, but the return potential is higher for Ukrainians thanks to better education and stronger work motivation. As the European Commission report states, Ukrainians receive more uniform treatment than Syrians, leading to more efficient integration. This makes the Ukrainian wave not a burden, but an investment with rapid payback.

From 2022 to the end of 2025, the arrival of Ukrainians has not only failed to worsen the budget – it has brought positive change. According to the Clingendael Institute, the economic contribution of approximately 112,000 Ukrainians in 2024 (of whom 49,000 were employed) amounted to €3.5 billion, or 0.36 % of national income. That exceeds the maintenance costs (€3.4 billion in 2024), creating net profit. The year-by-year breakdown shows growing contribution as integration progresses:

- 2022: Initial contribution was lower due to the adjustment period, but even then Ukrainians filled 10–15 % of vacancies in services and retail, contributing 0.1–0.2 % to GDP growth (ECB estimates). Approximate return: around €1 billion, thanks to rapid employment of 20–30 % of refugees.

- 2023: Employment rose to 50 %, contribution estimated at €2–2.5 billion, helping to reduce labour shortages (30,000 new jobs for Ukrainians, according to the IMF).

- 2024: €3.5 billion (confirmed by Clingendael), with 59–66 % employed.

- 2025 (forecast): €4–5 billion, assuming employment rises to 70 % and the Temporary Protection Directive is extended.

The overall Dutch migration budget has increased, yet the budget deficit has improved: from 2.8 % of GDP in 2025 to a projected 2.1 % in 2030 (Ministry of Finance). Municipalities such as Utrecht received extra funds (e.g., €23 million for care), but also benefited from taxes paid by working Ukrainians. At national level, the 2025 OECD report notes stable migration flows with positive economic impact through the filling of vacancies. IMF research shows that Ukrainians helped reduce labour shortages, especially in 2023 when 30,000 found work. These figures render “burden” arguments baseless – the profit accumulates every year.

The influx of Ukrainians has not disrupted the Dutch labour market; on the contrary, it has enriched it. According to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), as of May 2025, 61 % of Ukrainian refugees were employed, compared with 57 % a year earlier. CEPR research confirms: no negative impact on local employment or unemployment. Ukrainians often work in business services, temporary agency work and retail – sectors in which Dutch citizens show less interest. The ECB estimates that this has eased tension on the EU labour market. Unemployment in the Netherlands has remained at 3.5–4 %, while GDP growth is partly attributable to this additional workforce.

The arrival of Ukrainians has exposed existing problems in public services such as housing and healthcare, but it has also stimulated improvements. The Eurofound report notes that the influx exacerbated pre-existing issues but led to expansion of services (e.g., €220 million extra for healthcare in 2024). In 2025, the Temporary Protection Directive was extended, providing stability. Surveys show high satisfaction: between 2022 and 2024, a majority of Dutch people were content with the aid given to Ukrainians despite financial pressures. This demonstrates the system’s adaptability.

Municipal leaders are positive. Utrecht’s deputy mayor praised Ukrainian integration and their community contribution in a Eurocities interview. Oosterhout mayor Mark Buijs said: “You can learn from the courage with which Ukrainians fight for their freedom.” Defence Minister Kajsa Ollongren emphasised: “Supporting Ukraine is a cheap way to protect NATO,” including the reception of refugees. These voices sharply contrast with the criticism and reveal the real positive picture.

The Netherlands can learn from neighbours that have created the most favourable conditions. In Poland, which has taken in more than 1 million Ukrainians, integration is exemplary: in 2024 their contribution amounted to 2.7 % of GDP, with employment rates of 61–69 %. The government simplified access to work, education and healthcare, pushing national unemployment to record lows. UNHCR states: “Ukrainian refugees will continue to have a positive impact that far exceeds the costs.”

In Germany, 1.25 million Ukrainians are integrating faster than other refugee groups, thanks to language courses and qualification recognition. The IMF stresses: “Proper integration brings economic benefits.” Their contribution has eased labour-market pressure, and private hosting has improved adaptation. These models show that favourable conditions maximise returns.

LSE surveys indicate that the war in Ukraine has not radically changed Dutch opinion on the EU or immigration, yet some right-wing parties (BBB, NSC) are stepping up demands for greater Ukrainian contributions. Why does Russian propaganda so persistently try, through Dutch right-wing parties, to distort Dutch attitudes toward Ukrainians who ended up here involuntarily because of military aggression? Reports by RAND and Al Jazeera speak of “pragmatic manipulation”: Moscow funds narratives via platforms such as Voice of Europe in order to sow division within the EU. It is part of a broader strategy to split Europe, with refugees as a prime target for disinformation. The facts about net profit completely refute this.

To overcome the scaremongering we need transparent integration programmes: expanded language courses, faster diploma recognition and public-private partnerships. Municipalities can receive more EU funding (Bruegel estimates over €40 billion available for refugees). Positive examples such as Sweden (65 % public support) show that focusing on contribution reduces prejudice.

One innovative solution is the construction of lightweight SIP homes (Structural Insulated Panels) for Ukrainians. These panels are energy-efficient, up to 80 % faster to erect than traditional construction and 20–30 % cheaper. Projects such as Hex House demonstrate their suitability for refugee housing. After the war ends and many Ukrainians return, these homes can become permanent housing for Dutch citizens, helping to solve the shortage (390,000 units). It is lighter on regulation yet highly effective in tackling the housing crisis.

Ukrainian refugees are not a burden – they are an investment in our future. Their courage and diligence enrich us. It is time to let go of fear and build solidarity.